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Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with 
more credit to the private sector and deeper financial 
markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in 
the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness 
of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of 
contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using 
firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 
2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to 
bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but 
the association between creditor rights and bank credit 
is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. 
Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact 
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that creditor rights change over time, the authors show 
that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change 
in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In 
particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index 
will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment 
by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the 
enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, 
the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 
80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal 
protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong 
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11 Introduction
A large body of recent research on law and economics documents a positive association between legal
institutions and ﬁnancial development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1999, Djankov et al. 2007).
Scholars now generally concede that legal institutions matter to ﬁnancial markets, and attention has
turned towards identifying and quantifying the speciﬁc mechanisms which link law and ﬁnance.
We contribute to this debate by focussing on ﬁnance and two aspects of legal systems: the laws on
creditor rights and the quality of contract enforcement by courts. We study how well laws on creditor
rights work under varying conditions of court enforcement. Our main ﬁnding is that while strengthening
creditor rights increases credit to ﬁrms, the payoﬀs from reforming these rights is lower in countries
where the enforcement system functions poorly.
Financial markets are plagued by risk and informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders,
but collateral pledged by borrowers helps attenuate adverse selection and moral hazard in these markets
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Besanko and Thakor 1987). This is because collateral acts both as a signaling
device by the borrower, and as an instrument ensuring good behavior of borrowers, given the existence
of a credible threat to expropriate assets when contracts are violated (Aghion and Bolton 1992; La
Porta et al. 1998). It follows that the extent to which the legal framework allows creditors to enforce
their rights to collateral matters to the working of credit markets. This hypothesis has been broadly
supported by a number of empirical studies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997;
henceforth LLSV) ﬁnd that in a cross-section of 49 countries, a creditor rights index which captures the
extent to which creditors can control the bankruptcy process is positively associated with the ratio of
credit to GDP. Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007; henceforth DMS) show that the same association
holds in a sample of 129 countries during the period 1978-2003.
Within this ﬁeld of inquiry into legal systems and ﬁnance, several cross-country studies (LLSV
1997; Beck et al. 2004; Qian and Strahan 2005) have shown that besides laws on the books, judicial
enforcement is also related to ﬁnancial outcomes. Laeven and Majnoni (2005), for instance, ﬁnd that
judicial eﬃciency is negatively correlated with interest rate spreads across countries. Johnson, McMillan
2and Woodruﬀ (2002) show that court enforcement of property rights is important to ﬁrm investment,
and hence, to ﬁrms’ demand for ﬁnance. Studies indicate that even within a country, ﬁnancial outcomes
vary across regions that have the same laws but diﬀerent court eﬃciency. Bianco et al. (2005) ﬁnd
that in Italian provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials, credit is less widely
available than elsewhere, while Marcella et al. (2001) show that Argentinean provinces with poor legal
enforcement have less credit available to borrowers and more non-performing bank loans.1
Thus, there is mounting evidence that both laws and their enforcement matter in credit markets.
However, while the literature acknowledges that the two are distinct aspects of the legal system, the
empirical approach so far has mostly assumed that they work independently of each other. This as-
sumption ignores the possibility that the eﬀectiveness of laws depends directly on the institutions which
are meant to implement them. For instance, the government may have limited resources to enforce new
laws. The judiciary may not have the training to understand how these laws are applied in practice, or
it may be slow in resolving credit contracts that are in dispute. Dishonest government oﬃcials could
subvert the spirit of these laws, and in case credit contracts are in dispute, judges may be bribed to
inﬂuence the outcome of a case.
It is well documented that the quality of courts as enforcement mechanisms can vary independently
of the quality of the law on the books (LLSV 1998; Pistor 2000). Furthermore, there is evidence that
across countries, the quality of laws does not substitute for the quality of enforcement (LLSV 1998).2
If this is true- that laws and court enforcement are compliments rather than substitutes- then reforms
to creditor rights will be more eﬀective in settings where courts are more eﬃcient.
We use ﬁrm survey data from East European and Central Asian countries to explicitly test the
hypothesis that improving creditor rights in loan contracts is more eﬀective when courts can enforce
contracts by resolving disputes fairly and quickly. In our regression analysis of bank credit used by
ﬁrms, we implement this test by estimating the coeﬃcient on the interaction between a creditor rights
index and measures of court eﬃciency.
Our methodology is based on the fact that laws on the books and legal enforcement are conceptually
and empirically distinct. The distinction between rights and enforcement is particularly salient in our
3sample of transition economies, given the widespread evidence on the “transplantation” of new laws
into Eastern Europe after the fall of communism (Fairgrieve 1998; Dahan 2000; Pistor et al. 2000).
Collateral (secured transactions) laws were transplanted during the transition because readily ex-
portable models were available to recipient countries, and because these laws were considered a high
priority for reform that sought to catch up with the west and meet EU regulations. Indeed, many of
these laws were adopted rapidly in the region, heedless of the legal and institutional context in which
they were meant to function. The result, as reported in Pistor et al. (2000), was that the formal in-
vestor protection achieved in CIS countries by 1998 was not mirrored in measures of legal eﬀectiveness.3
This evidence on the rapid borrowing of laws is also supported by the absence of a positive correlation
between changes in creditor rights and enforcement measures in our data.
In addition to our focus on the interaction of law and legal eﬀectiveness, our use of ﬁrm-level data also
distinguishes us from most of the previous work on law and ﬁnance. Cross-country analysis which looks
at country level ﬁnancial aggregates can at best only suggest at the mechanisms aﬀecting the observed
aggregates, and cannot examine if diﬀerent types of borrowers and lenders are aﬀected diﬀerently. In
recognition of these shortcomings, there is now a trend towards using micro level data. Thus, Visaria
(2006) looks at bank loans to measure the microeconomic eﬀect of debt-recovery tribunals in India,
and ﬁnds that their establishment reduced delinquency in loan repayment. Haselmann et al. (2006)
show that in their sample of bank loans from 12 transition countries, lending increased in response to
changes in collateral and bankruptcy laws, and to a greater extent for newer banks. Our study adds
to this picture by using data from ﬁrms instead of banks, and by showing that the eﬀect of creditor
rights reforms varied not only under diﬀerent measures of enforcement, but also across diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms.
Focussing on the interaction of creditor rights and enforcement also allows us to address the en-
dogeneity problem that other studies have faced, namely, the possible correlation between the levels
of these variables and other unobserved determinants of bank lending. We argue that such omitted
variables are unlikely to be correlated with the interaction of rights and enforcement. What is more,
the interaction of enforcement with changes in rights is even less likely to be correlated with changes
4in unobservable determinants of credit. Thus, exploiting the panel dimension of our data and the fact
that creditor rights change over time, we show our result to be robust to the inclusion of country and
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our results also survive a number of sensitivity tests. They are robust to using diﬀerent national
or sub-national measures of enforcement capacity, and to allowing time trends in credit to have varied
across industries or across regions with diﬀerent enforcement. We show that they are not aﬀected by
allowing the eﬀect of creditor rights to diﬀer across diﬀerent sized ﬁrms or across rich and poor countries.
Addressing the concern that the ﬁndings are speciﬁc to our sample of transition economies, we are able
to replicate them on a larger cross-country data set which has information on creditor rights, court
enforcement and the private credit to GDP ratio for 129 countries over a period of 25 years.4
Our main result indicates that the eﬀect of creditor rights reform on bank credit depends on court
eﬃciency, and that these reforms have signiﬁcantly higher payoﬀs when courts have the capacity to
enforce contracts. The point estimates imply that reforming creditor rights will have a low positive
impact in a country at the lower end of the enforcement distribution, but will be remarkably eﬀective
in high enforcement countries. In particular, the point estimate of the diﬀerential impact of creditor
rights implies that a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank ﬁnancing in
ﬁrm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution
(Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this
distribution (Kyrgyzstan). This ﬁnding has important implications for the need for judicial reform,
and for how the policy choice between diﬀerent ﬁnancial market reforms may depend on the underlying
enforcement institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our data, and presents
summary statistics and correlations among the main variables. Section 3 spells out our empirical
strategy, including the robustness analysis. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5
concludes.
52 Data and Main Variables
2.1 Firm Level Data
We test our hypothesis about the joint eﬀect of creditor rights and enforcement on bank credit using
ﬁrm data collected through the World Bank’s “Enterprise Surveys” conducted in 2005 and 2002.5 For
the year 2005, we have data on 10,500 ﬁrms from 27 countries situated mainly in Eastern and Central
Europe. We use these data in our cross-section analysis. The 2002 surveys covered fewer countries,
but a subset of ﬁrms surveyed in 2002 were resurveyed in 2005. We use this data set, which includes
1200 ﬁrms observed in 2002 and 2005 across 21 countries, to estimate panel regressions with ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects.
As a robustness check, we also test our hypothesis on the cross-country data set used by Djankov
et al. (2007) (hereafter, DMS). This data set covers 129 countries over the period 1978-2005.
Below, we describe the main variables used in this study. In addition, Table 1 gives a detailed
description of these main variables, and Table 2 summarizes them by country.
2.2 Dependent Variables
Our main outcome variables are measures of the extent to which banks ﬁnance ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, these
variables are the percentage of a ﬁrm’s new investment that is ﬁnanced through bank loans, and a
binary indicator for whether a ﬁrm has a bank loan outstanding. These variables are based on separate
questions in the ﬁrm surveys. The bank ﬁnancing share is our best ﬁrm-level measure of overall levels of
bank credit. However, unlike the binary loan indicator, it cannot distinguish between scenarios where
more ﬁrms have bank loans, or the same set of ﬁrms have larger loans. Thus, the loan dummy enables
us to look at the extensive margin of change in bank lending, and also to check that our results are not
driven by large changes in credit for a few ﬁrms.
In regressions using the country-level DMS data set, our dependent variable is private credit relative
to GDP. This variable measures total credit to the private sector from the banking sector.
62.3 Explanatory Variables
Our main explanatory variables are measures of creditor rights (CR), credit information (CI) systems
and court enforcement in the surveyed countries.
We measure the legal rights of creditors using the Creditor Rights Index developed in DMS. This
index measures four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy, with higher values indicating stronger
creditor rights over collateral. Table 1 describes the four components of the CR index. Whenever
possible, we also use a newer, ﬁner version of this index, which ranges in value from 1 to 9 and is
updated annually in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report.6
Besides creditor rights, the literature on ﬁnancial market reforms has also identiﬁed credit informa-
tion systems as a mechanism for improving ﬁnancial intermediation. Therefore, we consider it important
to control for CI levels in our analysis. We measure CI by a binary indicator for whether a public credit
registry or a private credit bureau exists in the country. This indicator too was used in DMS, and has
since been updated in the Doing Business reports.7
Contract enforcement is a broad concept which cannot be captured in a single index. The strategy
we adopt is to use several alternative measures of enforcement; these vary at either the national or
the sub-national level. At the country level, we use CourtTime, a measure of the time in calendar
days to resolve a contract dispute. Higher values of this variable imply poorer court enforcement. The
methodology behind this measure was developed in Djankov et al. (2003). A comparable measure of
time in court, which is based on this methodology, is updated annually in the Doing Business Report.
The variables CourtSpeed and Enforce are similar measures of enforcement, but based on ﬁrm
responses to questions about judicial eﬃciency in our survey data. Firms were asked to rate a number
of key dimensions of court eﬃciency on a scale of 0 to 6, with higher rankings associated with more
eﬃcient courts. CourtSpeed is a measure of the ﬁrm’s perception of the speed of judicial enforcement,
with higher values implying faster courts. Enforce is a measure of the ﬁrm’s conﬁdence in judicial
enforcement, with higher values implying that courts are more capable of enforcing decisions.
Firm responses to questions about judicial eﬃciency may reﬂect ﬁrm characteristics and perfor-
7mance, and so might be correlated with unobserved determinants of the supply and demand for credit.
To account for this possible endogeneity in ﬁrm perceptions of court enforcement, we average these ﬁrm
responses by regions within countries. Thus, CourtSpeed and Enforce vary at the sub-national level.8
On average, across all the countries in our data, the percentage of ﬁrm investment ﬁnanced by banks
is about 11%. However, as the cross-section data summary statistics presented in Table 2 show, there
is considerable variation in bank ﬁnancing across countries. For instance, in Georgia, this ﬁgure is
23%, while in Turkey, it is about 6%. There is also signiﬁcant variation in creditor rights and court
enforcement across the 27 surveyed countries. The variable CourtTime ranges from 980 days in Poland
to 150 days in Estonia. Similarly, the average of the ﬁrm rating of court enforcement is 4 in Estonia,
while it is 3 in Poland. Table 3 presents changes in the creditor rights index between 2002 and 2005.
During this period, these rights improved in four countries- Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Russia- and
worsened in one country- Romania.
2.4 Correlations
Table 4 presents correlations between the levels of the main explanatory variables in 2005. Creditor
rights, credit information bureaus and national income are all positively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with the percentage of ﬁrm investment which is ﬁnanced by bank loans. Time taken by courts is
negatively correlated with bank ﬁnancing, indicating that in countries with slower courts, ﬁrms on
average have lower bank ﬁnancing of new investment. In general, there is a positive correlation between
all three measures of enforcement, creditor rights and national income.9 These correlations imply that
in a cross-section, it is diﬃcult to identify separately the ﬁnancial market impacts of creditor rights,
enforcement and general economic development.
Table 5 presents correlations between the three measures of the level of court enforcement and the
changes, in our 2002-05 panel data, in creditor rights and credit information bureaus. Increases in
creditor rights were negatively correlated with enforcement, although the correlations are weaker for
the ﬁrm-reported measures of enforcement. If our hypothesis is correct, then this correlation implies
that regressing change in creditor rights on change in bank credit without interacting the former with
8enforcement would lead to an underestimation of the eﬀect of rights. We also note that creditor rights
increases were positively correlated with national income, while the correlation was negative for credit
information increase. This is consistent with the observation in DMS that rich countries are more likely
to choose creditor rights over credit information systems.
2.5 Illustrations of the Empirical Approach
Our empirical strategy allows us to deal with the problem presented by the correlation in rights, en-
forcement and income by focussing on the interaction of creditor rights and enforcement. Before moving
to the regression speciﬁcation, we give two graphical illustrations of the strategy.
In the cross-section, our focus on the interaction between creditor rights and enforcement is a double
diﬀerence approach, since it compares how the eﬀect of a diﬀerence in rights diﬀers across good and
bad enforcement. Figure 1 depicts a simple illustration of this approach. The x-axis measures creditor
rights and the y-axis, CourtTime. The boldface number in every quadrant is the average, across all
ﬁrms in all countries that fall in the quadrant, of the percentage of new investment ﬁnanced by banks.
As we move right along the x-axis, that is, from countries with weak creditor rights to those with strong
rights, the increase in bank ﬁnancing is higher in the lower half of the graph, which is where countries
with better enforcement lie. This shows that in our data, the association between rights and bank
ﬁnance is stronger where enforcement is better.
In the panel, our strategy is a triple diﬀerence approach, since it looks at how the eﬀect of a change in
rights diﬀers across good and bad enforcement. Likewise, Figure 2 depicts the association, in our panel
data, between increases in creditor rights and increases in bank ﬁnancing. These are shown separately
for countries with slow courts and those with fast courts. As expected, the relationship is more positive
when courts are eﬃcient.10
93 Empirical Strategy
To test how creditor rights, credit information systems and court enforcement aﬀect bank credit, we
regress ﬁrm credit outcomes on measures of these institutional variables. Since we are interested in how
the eﬀect of creditor rights depends on enforcement, we allow the coeﬃcient on creditor rights to vary
by enforcement. Our basic regression speciﬁcation is:
xijt = α + βCRjt + γCIjt + νEnforcej + β2CRjt ∗ Enforcej + ǫijt (1)
Here, CRjt and CIjt measure, respectively, creditor rights and credit information in country j in
period t. Enforcej measures contract enforcement capacity in country j. This variable is assumed to
be ﬁxed over the time span studied. The main coeﬃcient of interest is β2, which is the coeﬃcient on
the interaction of creditor rights with enforcement. It measures how the relationship between creditor
rights and the outcome variable varies with contract enforcement capacity. If enforcement is increasing
in Enforcej, then a positive β2 indicates that the impact of creditor rights on bank credit is increasing
in court enforcement. This is what our hypothesis leads us to expect.
We ﬁrst estimate the above equation on the cross-section of 10,500 ﬁrms that were sampled by the
World Bank in 2005. This regression allows us to look at the association between bank credit, credit
institutions and contract enforcement capacity at the ﬁrm level, and across countries. This improves
on past studies which were restricted to country-level credit outcomes, because such studies could not
examine how many ﬁrms and which sort of ﬁrms are aﬀected by credit law reforms. Since most of the
variation in the explanatory variables is at the country level, we always present robust standard errors
which are clustered by country.
We estimate equation (1) using several alternative measures of enforcement. For every enforcement
measure, we focus on two ﬁrm-level bank credit outcomes. The ﬁrst outcome variable is the proportion
of new ﬁrm investment that is ﬁnanced by bank loans, and it allows us to study how the average quantity
of bank lending changes across ﬁrms. This measure reﬂects both changes in the set of ﬁrms that get
bank loans, and changes in the average amount borrowed. In order to delineate the ﬁrst of these eﬀects,
10we use as our second outcome variable a binary indicator for the ﬁrm having a bank loan. It allows us
to see if the set of ﬁrms that get access to any bank credit changes.
The assumption which enables us to identify the interaction eﬀect in a cross-section is that the
interaction of creditor rights and enforcement is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of bank
credit. In a sample of fewer than thirty countries in which most of these variables are measured at
the country level, it is possible that this assumption is violated. For instance, creditor rights, court
enforcement and gross domestic product tend to be positively correlated across countries, and it could
be that the interaction term picks up some non-linear eﬀect of overall wealth or development on bank
credit. Moreover, ﬁrms could be systematically diﬀerent across countries that vary in the interaction of
credit institutions with enforcement.
To deal with these issues, we ﬁrst add ﬁrm and country level controls to the cross-section estimations
. In particular, we add controls for ﬁrm size, ownership and industry. We control for diﬀerences in the
overall level of development with the logarithm of gross national income. Adding these controls does
not aﬀect the estimate of β2.
Our second strategy for dealing with the endogeneity problem exploits the fact that a subset of the
2005 sample consists of ﬁrms that were visited in 2002. Since creditor rights change over time, we can
identify how the eﬀect of a change in CR varies by enforcement. We do this by estimating the above
equation on the panel of ﬁrms, and allowing for ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects:
xijt = αijt + βCRjt + γCIjt + β2CRjt ∗ Enforcej + νY eart + ǫijt (2)
The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect αijt controls for all unobserved country or ﬁrm level characteristics that are
correlated with the explanatory variables. Thus, the diﬀerential impact of creditor rights on bank
credit is identiﬁed by seeing how the relationship between changes in CR and changes in ﬁrms’ bank
credit usage varies by enforcement. The identifying assumption in this speciﬁcation is that changes
in unobserved determinants of bank credit are uncorrelated with the interaction of changes in creditor
rights and enforcement. Note that this assumption holds even if changes in unobserved determinants
11of bank credit are correlated with court enforcement, or with creditor rights reforms alone.
3.1 Robustness Analysis
One concern with the regression speciﬁcation described in equation 2 is that it does not allow the
eﬀect of changes in credit information to vary by court enforcement. The results in DMS indicate
that information and creditor rights are alternative ways to improve ﬁnancial markets, and that credit
registries seem to matter more in poorer economies. Since poorer economies tend to have worse court
enforcement, this ﬁnding suggests that enforcement is complementary to creditor rights but not to credit
information systems.
Nonetheless, it is safer to assume that both creditor rights and credit information bureaus could have
a heterogenous eﬀect depending on enforcement. We prefer this more general empirical speciﬁcation
because there is a negative correlation between changes in creditor rights and information in our data.
Therefore, all the panel estimation results presented are those in which both creditor rights and credit
information are interacted with enforcement.11
Except for one case (Romania), creditor rights either stayed constant or increased over time in our
panel. As a result, any unobserved shocks to ﬁnancial markets during this period that also varied
systematically across countries with diﬀerent courts would be picked up by the interaction of creditor
rights with courts. The most ﬂexible control for such heterogenous shocks is to allow for a diﬀerential
time trend by enforcement, 12 and we show that our results are not sensitive to allowing countries which
diﬀer in enforcement to have diﬀerent time trends in bank credit.13
The second concern in estimating equation 2 is that court enforcement is positively correlated with
more general measures of development, such as national income. This would be an issue in interpreting
our results if the eﬀect of creditor rights depended on other dimensions of institutional quality which are
correlated with, but not the same, as court enforcement. It would not be a problem if such institutions
mattered to creditor rights only through their aﬀect on contract enforcement. A related concern is that
the extent of the market failure which creditor rights address might be correlated with enforcement
across countries. If so, enforcement would also proxy for the extent of ﬁnancial market failure. However,
12note that creditor rights will have a greater impact where risk and informational asymmetries are more
pronounced. Since these market failures are likely to be more acute in less-developed countries, this
bias would be in a direction opposite to the interaction eﬀect our hypothesis implies, and so would not
drive our results.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the eﬀect of creditor rights depends on other
institutions that are correlated with the overall level of development but have nothing to do with
enforcement. We address this issue by estimating a modiﬁed version of equation 2 in which we also
allow for a diﬀerential eﬀect of creditor rights across rich and poor countries. This is done by including
an interaction between national income and creditor rights as a control variable.
Following the observation in Pistor et al. (2000) that transition economies were able to transplant
laws but not the institutions that enforce them, we consider enforcement to be a “initial” institutional
condition in this study. In other words, we are interested in the long run component of court enforce-
ment. Our measure of this long-run institution - court eﬃciency measured in 2002- is imperfect if there
were substantive changes in enforcement procedures during this period. This could bias our estimates
of the interaction, but only if changes in court eﬃciency were correlated with initial court eﬃciency.
However, neither concern appears to be the case in our data. Our court eﬃciency measures do not
change much during 2003-05. For example, the Doing Business measure of court time changes in 7 of
the 21 panel countries, and the median change in these 7 countries is only -6%. Moreover the change,
if any, is uncorrelated with 2003 levels of court eﬃciency. The correlation between the change in the
Doing Business measure of court time and court time in 2003 is -0.14, and it is not signiﬁcant at the
10% level. As a result, country rankings by court eﬃciency stay the same during this period. Thus, our
preferred speciﬁcation uses a ﬁxed court enforcement measures. We also show that our panel results
are unaﬀected if we replace ﬁxed enforcement measures with contemporaneous, time-varying measures.
Another concern with our analysis is that the identiﬁcation relies on changes in creditor rights across
a relatively small number of countries over a short period of three years. Our identiﬁcation strategy,
which is based on a triple diﬀerencing, insulates us from the usual endogeneity problems seen in most
cross-country studies. But it is possible that our results are driven by some unobserved development in
13a few of the sampled countries. We have veriﬁed that our results are robust to dropping outliers in court
enforcement. As a further check, we replicate our estimation results on a data set which comprises 129
countries over a twenty-ﬁve year period. This is the country-level panel data set which is used in DMS.
Speciﬁcally, we run the equivalent of our main speciﬁcation on this data set by putting in country ﬁxed
eﬀects, and estimating the coeﬃcient on the interaction between time-varying creditor rights and the
DMS measure of court time.
It is possible that changes in creditor rights have a heterogeneous eﬀect on ﬁrms, and depend on
ﬁrms characteristics like size and ownership. There is evidence in the literature that creditor rights
have a heterogeneous eﬀect across banks (Haselmann et al. 2006), and the same could be true of ﬁrms.
Moreover, if the distribution of these ﬁrm characteristics varied systematically across countries that
diﬀer in enforcement, then this heterogeneous impact could bias our estimate of the interaction eﬀect
of laws and enforcement. We check that this is not the case by adding interactions of creditor rights
with ﬁrm size and ownership variables as controls, and ﬁnding that this does not change our estimate
of the coeﬃcient on the interaction between law and enforcement.
4 Results
4.1 Cross-section Regression Results
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from estimating equation 1 by OLS on the cross-section of ﬁrms
surveyed by the World Bank in 2005. In Table 6 the dependent variable is the percentage of new
investment ﬁnanced by bank loans. The ﬁrst pair of regressions use time in court (CourtTime) to
measure enforcement. The second pair measure enforcement by regional averages of ﬁrms’ perception
of judicial enforcement (Enforce), while the third pair use regional averages of ﬁrms’ perception of the
speed of courts (CourtSpeed). We ﬁnd that for all these measures, the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient
on the interaction of creditor rights with enforcement goes in the direction our hypothesis leads us to
expect. It is signiﬁcant for both ﬁrm-reported measures of enforcement (columns 3-6), though not so
for the country-level measure CourtTime (columns 1-2).
14As reported in column (3), the coeﬃcient on the interaction of creditor rights with Enforce is 0.305,
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Since Enforce is an index increasing from 1 to 6, this estimate implies
that the impact of a unit change in creditor rights on the fraction of new investment ﬁnanced by
banks increases by 1.5 percentage points as enforcement improves from the best to the worst possible.
The estimated interaction eﬀect is similar in Column 4, which presents the same regression but with
additional controls, namely ﬁrm size, industry, ownership, and the logarithm of gross national income.
Columns 5 and 6 show that this pattern is repeated when we measure enforcement by CourtSpeed.
Since CourtSpeed also ranges in value from 1 to 6, it is good to note that the point estimates of the
interaction eﬀect are of similar magnitudes to those in column 3.
Table 7 presents the same set of regressions; here the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
the ﬁrm has a bank loan. This variable is insensitive to the amounts borrowed, and measures the
extensive margin of change in bank lending. We ﬁnd that the results for this outcome resemble those
in Table 6: the interaction of creditor rights with enforcement is positive and signiﬁcant for both
ﬁrm-reported measures of enforcement (columns 3-6).
In a cross-section of countries, it is possible that the interaction of credit laws and court enforcement
is correlated with unobserved diﬀerences in country characteristics which aﬀect ﬁnancial outcomes.
Moreover, we are unable to assign an expected sign to this omitted variable bias. These country “ﬁxed
eﬀects” could be why the country-level measure of time in courts does not give signiﬁcant results. In
the next section, when we control for this bias by exploiting changes in creditor rights, we ﬁnd that all
three measures of enforcement give consistent and signiﬁcant results.
4.2 Panel Regression Results
The panel dimension of our data allows us to look at how changes in a ﬁrm’s use of bank credit are
related to changes in credit institutions, and how this relationship varies with court enforcement. Table
8 estimates equation 2 with the country-level measure CourtTime interacted with creditor rights and
credit information. In column (1), the dependent variable is the share of bank credit in new investment.
The coeﬃcient of interest, the interaction of creditor rights (CR) with CourtTime is negative (-0.007)
15and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Since higher values of CourtTime mean slower courts, the negative
estimate indicates that the eﬀect of creditor rights on the use of bank credit for new investment by the
average ﬁrm is increasing in the speed with which courts resolve disputes. This is in keeping with our
hypothesis that reform works better when courts can enforce the new laws.
Suppose that the time taken by courts to resolve a dispute decreases by 100 days, a change well
within the range of our data on court time. Then, the point estimate of the interaction term implies
that the impact of a unit increase in creditor rights on the percentage of new investment ﬁnanced by
bank loans would rise by 7 percentage points. Given that in our sample, investment ﬁnanced by bank
loans is 11% on average, this 7 percentage point diﬀerential is of remarkable magnitude.
To check against the possibility that this result is driven by a positive shock to bank credit in
countries with faster courts, in column (2) we allow the time trend to vary by CourtTime. This does
not aﬀect the sign or the signiﬁcance of the creditor rights and court time interaction coeﬃcient. In
fact, the estimated magnitude of the interaction eﬀect is now greater. Thus, our result is robust to
allowing the change in bank credit to have diﬀered by enforcement.
In Columns (3) and (4) we report regressions in which we have used the dummy for a bank loan
outstanding as the dependent variable. The interaction term between CR and CourtTime is, once
again, negative and signiﬁcant. This indicates that the eﬀect of credit law reform on the set of ﬁrms
that get a bank loan is increasing in the speed of court enforcement.
The next pair of tables present regressions similar to those reported in Table 8, but using the ﬁrm-
reported measures of judicial eﬃciency. As in the previous table, for each enforcement measure, we look
at two outcomes: the share of new investment ﬁnanced by bank loans, and the binary loan indicator.
Table 9 uses ﬁrm reported level of judicial enforcement (Enforce), while Table 10 uses the ﬁrms’ rating
of the speed of courts in resolving disputes (CourtSpeed). For both measures, higher values indicate
better enforcement capacity.
We have averaged these ﬁrm-reported measures by region within every country. This is to account for
the potential endogeneity of ﬁrm perception. Firms in the same area may report diﬀerent experiences
with the judiciary not just because they faced diﬀerent types of courts but also because they had
16diﬀerent characteristics or were in diﬀerent situations. These unobserved ﬁrm characteristics would be
a problem if correlated with credit usage. Taking regional averages avoids this bias, and at the same
time exploits within-country variation in court enforcement.
In Table 9, the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the interaction between creditor rights and Enforce
is positive and signiﬁcant for both measures of bank credit. Thus, the impact of creditor rights is
increasing in regional judicial enforcement. The same pattern of positive and signiﬁcant interaction
terms (CR*CourtSpeed) for both outcomes, and both with and without diﬀerential time eﬀects, is seen
in Table 10. Thus, these panel regression results strongly suggest that the eﬀect of a reform in creditor
rights on bank lending varies signiﬁcantly with the enforcement capacity of courts.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Table 11 presents results from estimating equation 2 after adding the interaction of creditor rights with
the logarithm of national income as a control variable.14 As explained in section 3.1, this is to test for
the possibility that our results are driven by a diﬀerential impact of creditor rights across rich and poor
countries, instead of across good and bad courts. We present results for all three measures of court
enforcement. Columns 1-3 show that in none of the cases is our estimate of the CR and enforcement
interaction aﬀected by allowing creditor rights to have a diﬀerential impact by national income. This
indicates that our results are not driven by the correlation of court enforcement with more general
indicators of development.
Our measure of long-run enforcement - court eﬃciency in 2003- is imperfect to the extent that
there were substantive changes in enforcement procedures during this period. Table 12 replaces these
ﬁxed measures with contemporaneous time-varying measures of court eﬃciency to show that our results
are robust to allowing enforcement to change over the sample period. Columns (1) and (3) use time-
varying CourtTime, while (2) and (4) use time-varying Enforce. As in the previous tables, we look
at two outcomes for each enforcement measure: the share of new investment ﬁnanced by bank loans
(columns 1-2), and the binary loan indicator (columns 3-4). In each speciﬁcation, the interaction of CR
with time-varying enforcement is signiﬁcant and of the same sign and magnitude as in the corresponding
17estimation using ﬁxed enforcement. For example, in column (1), the coeﬃcient on CR*CourtTime is
-0.008, signiﬁcant at 1% level. This is comparable to the CR*CourtTime estimate of -0.007 in column
(1) of Table 8, which corresponds to the same speciﬁcation with ﬁxed CourtTime. Likewise, in column
(2) of Table 12 the estimate of the coeﬃcient on CR*Enforce is 5.97; the corresponding estimate for
the interaction of CR with ﬁxed Enforce was 6.69 (column (1) of Table 9).
Next, in Table 13 we address the concern that our results could be sensitive to unobserved changes
in a few countries that also happen to be correlated with the interaction of credit law reform and
enforcement. We do so by estimating the equivalent of equations 1 and 2 on a panel of 129 countries
over the twenty-ﬁve year period 1978-2003. This is the data set which was used in Djankov et al. (2007).
As the authors note, there were about 30 instances of credit law changes during this period. This data
set has the same creditor rights and credit information index that we have used in all our estimations;
moreover, their measure of contract enforcement time is identical to CourtTime. The outcome variable
in these country-level regressions is the ratio of private credit to GDP.
As in all the previous regressions, we test our hypothesis by interacting creditor rights with enforce-
ment time. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 13, which include country ﬁxed eﬀects and so are the equivalent
of our ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, show that our results are replicated on this wider and deeper panel.
Column 3 shows that this is robust to allowing the time trend to diﬀer by enforcement. Once we control
for the diﬀerent scale of the ﬁrm-level and the country-level outcome variables, even the magnitude of
the estimated interaction term is close to our ﬁrm panel estimate.
4.4 What Do Our Estimates Imply?
As measured by time spent in enforcing a contract through courts, there is substantial variation in
contract enforcement across countries. Our estimates of the interaction term allow us to measure the
eﬀect of this variation on the impact of creditor rights on the percentage of ﬁrm investment ﬁnanced
by banks.
Consider a country close to the 10th percentile of the distribution of CourtTime across the 129
countries in the DMS data. In Lithuania, it takes only 153 days to resolve contract disputes in courts.
18According to the estimates in column 1 of Table 8, in Lithuania the eﬀect of a unit increase in the
creditor rights index would be 3.2 (= 4.306− 0.007 ∗ 153) percentage points.
Now consider Kyrgyzstan, which is at the 80th percentile of the distribution of enforcement time,
with a CourtTime of about 500 days. In Kyrgyzstan, the eﬀect of a unit increase in the creditor rights
index would be only 0.8 (= 4.306− 0.007 ∗ 500) percentage points.
Suppose that as a result of reforms, the creditor rights index increased from 0 to 4 in both countries.
Then, the numbers derived above imply that the share of new investment ﬁnanced by banks would go
up 12 percentage points in Lithuania. Since the average share of bank loans in ﬁrm investment was
11% in 2005, this is an increase of more than 100%. However, this share would increase by only 3.2
points, or 28%, in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, our results indicate that if court enforcement is good (within
the observed bounds), creditor rights reforms have a remarkable impact on bank lending. But if court
enforcement is poor, these reforms have a much smaller, though not insigniﬁcant impact.15
4.5 Heterogenous Eﬀects of Creditor Rights and Enforcement
In Table 14 we examine if changes in creditor rights have a heterogeneous eﬀect depending on ﬁrm
characteristics like size and ownership. First, in column (1) we add ﬁrm size16 interacted with CR as a
control, and ﬁnd that the estimate of the coeﬃcient on CR*CourtTime is unaﬀected, being close to its
value of -0.007 in column (1) of Table 8. In column (2), we then interact ﬁrm size with CR*CourtTime.
This coeﬃcient is estimated to be negative and signiﬁcant, implying that the CR*CourtTime interaction
eﬀect was felt more strongly in larger ﬁrms. One explanation could be that larger ﬁrms have more
tangible assets to put up as collateral, and so banks increase lending disproportionately to larger ﬁrms
when there is a de facto reform in creditor rights.
Next, in columns (3) and (4), we allow the eﬀect of CR and CR*CourtTime to vary by ﬁrm owner-
ship. The variable Govt. is a dummy indicating majority government ownership of ﬁrm, while Foreign
is a dummy indicating majority foreign ownership of ﬁrm. Thus, the omitted ownership category
is domestic private ownership. Once again, the coeﬃcient on CR*CourtTime is substantively unaf-
fected by these controls. As column (4) reports, we also ﬁnd that both Foreign*CR*CourtTime and
19Govt.*CR*CourtTime have positive coeﬃcients. This indicates that the CR*CourtTime interaction
eﬀect was strongest in domestic private ﬁrms. This may be because ﬁrms with foreign ownership can
more easily access international capital markets. Compared to foreign-owned ﬁrms, domestic ﬁrms are
more dependent on the ﬁnancial sector environment in the country in which they reside. Therefore, we
would expect the eﬀect of any domestic or local reform to have a higher impact on domestic ﬁrms. This
could explain why a de facto reform in creditor rights has a larger impact on private domestic ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
For legal rights to have any meaning, disputes involving these rights need to settled quickly and fairly
by courts. In the absence of enforcement, there is little to deter violations. Knowing this, banks hesitate
to enter into contracts based on these rights. We show this to be true in the case of laws which give
lenders better rights to collateral. In countries and regions with very poor court enforcement, reforms
in creditor rights have relatively little impact on bank lending to ﬁrms. Such reforms, however, have a
remarkable eﬀect on bank lending where court enforcement is eﬃcient.
The immediate implications of the measured interaction eﬀect are that court enforcement matters
in ﬁnancial markets, and that it needs to be taken into account when prescribing reforms in collateral
laws to improve access to credit. This is underscored by the fact that cross-country indicators of
enforcement quality, such as the Doing Business measure of court speed in resolving disputes, show
considerable variation across countries.
There is evidence that judicial enforcement varies signiﬁcantly even within countries.17 If this is the
case, then creditor rights reforms may be eﬀective only to the extent that regional and local governments
can enforce the new laws, and the pay-oﬀs from the reforms will vary accordingly across sub-national
regions. Thus, reforms to creditor rights at the national level might increase regional inequality.
However, our estimates also indicate that even in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, which are near
the lower end of the distribution of court enforcement, creditor rights reforms will have a small but
appreciably positive impact on bank credit. This suggests that the mechanisms through which creditor
20rights aﬀect ﬁnancial markets are partly independent of enforcement.
Thus, our ﬁndings have important policy implications about the design of creditor rights and other
ﬁnancial market reforms. Making creditor rights eﬀective depends critically on enforcement, but im-
provements to the judicial enforcement system are likely to take time. This makes it worthwhile to
consider reforming creditor rights in a manner that de-links them from court procedures. This can be
done by introducing out-of-court enforcement proceedings, or summary proceedings for courts which
reduce judicial discretion in the application of laws.
21Notes
1 Penheiro and Cabral (2001) ﬁnd similar patterns in judicial eﬃciency and credit markets within Brazil. Laeven and
Woodruﬀ (2006) ﬁnd that Mexican states with more eﬀective legal systems have larger ﬁrms.
2 “An investor in a French-civil-law country is poorly protected by both the laws and the system that enforces them.
The converse is true for an investor in a common-law country, on average.”(LLSV 1998).
3 Pistor et al. 2000 ﬁnd no positive correlation between either the level of laws on the books in 1998 or the change in
the laws over 1992-98 and various measures of legal eﬀectiveness in CIS countries.
4It is possible that both creditor rights and enforcement are driven by the third unobservable which also aﬀects bank
lending. For example, it might be that a CR reform in countries with good courts are driven by political economy
considerations diﬀerent from those driving a CR reform in a country with bad courts, and that such underlying causes
also aﬀect ﬁnancial markets directly. We cannot think of a particular mechanism of this type; nonetheless, our results
must be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
5See www.enterprisesurveys.org for a description of the survey methodology.
6 See www.doingbusiness.org.
7 Our cross-section estimations for 2005 use the newer Doing Business version of the CR and CI indices, since they are
ﬁner and contain more information. However, because the later versions of these indices are not available for 2002, the
panel regressions use the original DMS indices.
8For the purpose of this study, we consider enforcement to be an initial institutional condition. Thus, the panel
regressions use the level of CourtSpeed and Enforce in 2002. Since the earliest Doing Business report dates to 2003, we
use 2003 CourtTime when employing the Doing Business enforcement measure. Sections 3.1 discusses this assumption in
detail.
9Note that CourtTime is decreasing in better enforcement.
10 The line depicted is a non-parametric “locally-weighted least square regression” estimate. This smoothing technique
is used for illustration only, and the negative slope of this line in the slow courts panel should not be understood to imply
that the relationship between creditor rights and bank ﬁnancing is negative in countries with slow courts.
11None of the reported panel estimates of the interaction of enforcement with creditor rights are sensitive to including
or dropping the interaction of credit information with enforcement.
12Since there are only two time periods in the panel, this is equivalent to interacting time dummies with enforcement.
13It is possible that growth opportunities diﬀered across industries in our sample period. If so, and if the distribution
of industries varied systematically across countries and was correlated with changes in creditor rights, there could be a
correlation between changes in creditor rights and changes in growth opportunities. To control for this, we modiﬁed the
main speciﬁcation by including diﬀerent time trends for diﬀerent industries as controls. This did not aﬀect the estimated
interaction eﬀect.
2214 Gross National Income averaged over 2001-2003. All results are robust to using gross national income instead of its
logarithm, and to including the interaction of credit information with enforcement.
15The impact is almost nil at the very extreme of the court time distribution. For example, the coeﬃcient on creditor
rights would be zero if court time were 650 days.
16Measured by the number of permanent employees.
17 See, for example, Laeven and Woodruﬀ (2006) on Mexico.
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26Figure 2: Comparing Increases in Creditor Rights vs Increases in Bank Financing







































































27Table 1:  Description of the Variables 




Proportion of firms’ new investment financed by private, commercial banks.   
Source:  World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Available at www.enterprisesurveys.org.
Bank loan   Binary variable indicating whether or not a firm has a bank loan outstanding.  Variable 
takes on a value of 1 for a bank loan, and 0 otherwise.   




Index of regulations and procedures that affect the rights of creditors in the sample 
countries.   
Index for the cross section measures:  
This  index,  measure  the  degree  to  which  collateral  and  bankruptcy  laws  facilitate 
lending.  The index includes 3 aspects related to legal rights in bankruptcy and 7 aspects 
found in collateral law.  A score of 1 is assigned for each of the following features of the 
law;  1)  Secured  creditors  are  able  to  seize  their  collateral  when  debtor  enters 
reorganization – there is no automatic stay or asset freeze imposed by the court, 2) 
Secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm, 3) 
Management  does  not  stay  during  reorganization,  4)  a  general,  rather  than  specific, 
description  of  assets  is  permitted  in  collateral  agreements,  5)  General,  rather  than 
specific description of debt is permitted in collateral agreements, 6) Any legal or natural 
person may grant or take security in the property, 7) A unified registry that includes 
charges over movable property operates, 8) Secured creditors have priority outside of 
bankruptcy, 9) Parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract, 10) Creditors 
may seize and sell collateral out of court.  The index increases in strength of creditor 
rights, ranging from 0 to 10. 
Index for the panel measures:  
Whether  1)  There  are  restrictions,  such  as  creditor  consent,  when  a  debtor  files  for 
reorganization, 2) Secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the petition for 
reorganization is approved (e.g. no automatic stay), 3) Secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, and 4) Management does not stay 
during reorganization.  A value of one is added to the index when a country’s laws and 
regulations provide each of these powers to secured lenders.  The creditors rights index 
aggregates  the  scores  and  varies  between  0  (poor  creditors’  rights)  and  4  (strong 
creditors rights).    
Source:  Doing Business Report, available at www.doingbusiness.org.  The 2002 index is 




A measure of the availability of credit information.   
Index for the cross section measures: 
This index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit 
information available through either public or private bureaus.  A score of 1 is assigned 
28for each of the following 6 features of the credit information system; 1) Both positive 
and negative credit information is distributed, 2) Data on both firms and individuals are 
distributed, 3) Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial 
institutions are distributed, 4) More than 2 years of historical data are distributed, 5) 
Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed, 6) By law, borrowers have 
the right to access their data.   
Index for the panel measures:  
An indicator for whether a public credit bureau or private credit registry operates in the 
country.  The indicator takes on a value of 1 if either a public or private registry is in 
operation, 0 otherwise. 
Source:  Doing Business Report (www.doingbusiness.org). The 2002 index is from 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
Court Time  
(CourtTime)
Measure of the time in calendar days to resolve a contract dispute through the court 
system in the sample countries.   Higher values imply slower enforcement.   




Measure of firms’ perceptions regarding their confidence in the ability of the judiciary to 
enforce its decisions.  Scale ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values associated with more 
confidence in the judiciary.  Enforce is averaged at the regional level in every country.   
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).
Court Speed 
(CourtSpeed)
Measure of firms’ perceptions regarding their confidence in the ability of the judiciary to 
resolve business disputes quickly.  Scale ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values 
associated with higher perception of judicial speed.  CourtSpeed is averaged at the 
regional level in every country.   
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (www.enterprisesurveys.org).
Firm size 
(Size)
Size of firm, measured by number of permanent employees.  Used as control variable for 
cross section analysis.   




Indicator of whether or not firms have had a formal audit of their financial statements.  1 
indicates ‘yes’ and 2 indicates ‘no’.  Used as control variable for cross section analysis.   




Respectively, the ratio of credit to the private sector relative to GDP, and Gross National 
Income. 
Source:  Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
29Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
























Albania       18.16 
     (31.45) 
9 3 0 390 3.53 
(1.46) 
2.50    
(1.20) 
9.9 
Armenia       19.55 
(30.10) 












Bulgaria  17.35 
(32.76) 





Croatia  26.56 
(37.61) 














Estonia  11.73 
(25.87) 
4 5 150 4.05 
(1.44) 
2.31 
  (1.24) 
        42.4 
Georgia  23.22 
(37.84) 





Germany  18.49 
(29.22) 












Hungary  13.93 
(29.20) 





Ireland  25.54 
(39.24) 












Latvia  15.69 
(32.81) 





Lithuania  9.14 
(23.39) 





Macedonia  11.48 
(29.77) 





Moldova  15.88 
(29.92) 







3 1 4 980 2.98 
(1.27) 
2.02    
  (1.10) 
27.7 
Portugal  13.34 
(28.83) 





Romania  13.65 
(28.84) 












Kyrgyzstan  12.86 
(27.85) 


























Turkey  5.77 
(19.82) 





Ukraine  9.65 
(24.81) 





*Standard deviations across firms are shown in parentheses. 
**All summary statistics shown are for cross-section data, year 2005.   
30Table 3: Changes in the Creditor Rights and Credit Information
Indices Between 2002 and 2005
Country Increase in Increase in
























1. The Creditor Rights (Panel) Index ranges from 0-4.
2. The Credit Information (Panel) Index is a dummy variable which is equal to one is there
is a private credit bureau or a public credit registry.
31Table 4: Cross-sectional Correlations
Bank CR CI Court Court Court






Court -0.0503* -0.2540* -0.1649*
Time (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Court 0.0069 0.0484* 0.1156* -0.1485*
Enforcement (0.4762) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Court -0.0048 0.1032* 0.0911* -0.1457* 0.4501*
Speed (0.6249) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GNI 0.1175* 0.0792* 0.6403* -0.3349* 0.1501* 0.0752*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes:
1. Signiﬁcance level in parenthesis; * denotes 1% signiﬁcance level.
32Table 5: Correlations between Enforcement, National Income and
Changes in CR and CI






Court -0.0786* -0.1320* -0.0309
Enforcement (0.006) (0.000) (0.279)
Court -0.2003* 0.2563* -0.3465* 0.4960*
Speed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GNI 0.2588* -0.5338* 0.4244* 0.1318* -0.1815*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes:
1. ∆CR is the increase in CR between 2002 and 2005; ∆ is the increase in CI between 2002
and 2005.
33Table 6: Cross-Section Results on Bank Financing, Creditor Rights
and Enforcement
DepVar Bank Investment Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CR 1.804 1.581 .007 .094 .471 .492
(.720)
∗∗ (.655)
∗∗ (.511) (.495) (.421) (.397)





























log(GNI) 1.117 1.157 1.157
(1.220) (1.215) (1.195)










Obs. 9795 9795 9795 9795 9795 9795
R2 .014 .025 .014 .026 .014 .025
F statistic 4.561 14.962 7.407 13.929 4.233 14.429
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%,
** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. Ownership is a dummy which equals one for single proprietor ﬁrms. Industry is a dummy
equal to one for manufacturing ﬁrms, and zero for service ﬁrms.
34Table 7: Cross-Section Results on Bank Loans, Creditor Rights
and Enforcement
DepVar Bank Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CR .032 .022 .012 .015 .014 .014
(.018)
∗ (.017) (.013) (.011) (.009) (.007)
∗∗




























log(GNI) .049 .047 .045
(.031) (.030) (.030)










Obs. 9795 9795 9795 9795 9795 9795
R2 .023 .06 .024 .06 .026 .061
F statistic 7.24 15.08 12.31 16.35 10.71 15.58
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%,
** denotes 5%, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. Ownership is a dummy which equals one for single proprietor ﬁrms. Industry is a dummy
equal to one for manufacturing ﬁrms, and zero for service ﬁrms.
35Table 8: Panel Regression Results on Creditor Rights and Court
Time
DepVar: Bank Investment Bank Investment Bank Bank
Finance Finance Loan Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)












CI -1.812 3.401 -6.269 -15.158
(7.434) (8.002) (12.006) (12.611)
CI*CourtTime .001 -.011 .023 .046
(.017) (.018) (.027) (.028)









Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446 2446
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. CR*CourtTime is the interaction of CR with CourtTime. CI*CourtTime is the interaction
of CI with CourtTime.
36Table 9: CR and Regional Averages of Firm-reported Judicial
Eﬃciency
DepVar: Bank Investment Bank Investment Bank Bank
Finance Finance Loan Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)












CI -11.648 -29.139 22.126 7.123
(15.428) (17.646)
∗ (14.224) (33.164)
CI*Enforce 3.343 8.594 -6.344 -1.84
(5.399) (5.902) (3.99) (10.332)







Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446 2446
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. CR*Enforce is the interaction of CR with Enforce. CI*Enforce is the interaction of CI
with Enforce.
37Table 10: CR and Regional Averages of Firm-reported Judicial
Speed
DepVar: Bank Investment Bank Investment Bank Bank
Finance Finance Loan Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)










CI -6.041 -28.04 20.557 13.982
(10.294) (12.889)
∗∗ (14.116) (26.303)
CI*CourtSpeed 1.693 11.151 -7.655 -4.828
(4.79) (5.839)
∗ (6.482) (11.853)








Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446 2446
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. CR*CourtSpeed is the interaction of CR with CourtSpeed. CI*CourtSpeed is the interaction
of CI with CourtSpeed.
38Table 11: CR, Enforcement and National Income
DepVar: Bank Investment Bank Investment Bank Investment
Finance Finance Finance
(1) (2) (3)
CR -1.313 -1.181 -1.919
(3.173) (3.237) (3.186)











CR*log(GNI) 2.633 -1.050 -2.273
(1.998) (3.150) (1.723)





Firm FE Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446
R2 .572 .571 .572
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. log(GNI) is logarithm of gross national income (current U.S. Dollars), averaged over 2001-
2003. CR*log(GNI) is the interaction of CR with log(GNI).
39Table 12: Time-varying Court Enforcement Measures
DepVar: Bank Investment Finance Bank Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4)





CI 1.896 -5.272 -8.389 22.021























Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446 2446
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. CR*CourtTime (CI*CourtTime) is the interaction of CR (CI) with time-varying Court-
Time.
3. CR*Enforce(CI*Enforce) is the interaction of CR (CI) with time-varying Enforce.
40Table 13: CR, Court Time and Private Credit In 129 Countries
During 1978-2003
DepVar: PvtCredit/GDP PvtCredit/GDP PvtCredit/GDP
(1) (2) (3)


















Country FE Y Y
Obs. 2832 2832 2832
R2 .148 .847 .855
Notes:
1. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1%
level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of signiﬁcance.
2. Data on 129 countries over 1978-2003 (Source: DMS). The dependent variable is ratio of
Private Credit to GDP.
41Table 14: Heterogenous Eﬀects of Creditor Rights and Enforce-
ment
Depvar: Bank Investment Finance
Firm Characteristic: Firm Size Firm Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)











CI -1.799 -1.793 -1.898 -2.014
(7.439) (7.443) (7.439) (7.446)
CI*CourtTime .001 .001 .001 .001
























Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Obs. 2446 2446 2446 2446
Notes:
1. Fixed Eﬀects OLS panel estimations. Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clustering by
country in parenthesis. *** denotes 1% level, ** denotes 5% level, and * denotes 10% level of
signiﬁcance.
2. Size is ﬁrm size in 2002, measured by the number of permanent workers in 2002.
3. Govt. is a dummy indicating majority government ownership, and Foreign a dummy
indicating majority foreign ownership of the ﬁrm in 2002. Thus, the omitted ownership
category is domestic private ownership.
42Policy Research Working Paper Series
	 Title  Author  Date  Contact for paper
WPS4263	HIV/AIDS	and	Social	Capital	in	a	 Antonio	C.	David	 June	2007	 A.	David
	 Cross-Section	of	Countries	 	 	 82842
WPS4264	Financing	of	the	Private	Sector	in	 Constantinos	Stephanou	 June	2007	 S.	Coca
	 Mexico,	2000–05:	Evolution,	 Emanuel	Salinas	Muñoz	 	 37474
	 Composition,	and	Determinants
WPS4265	The	Structure	of	Import	Tariffs	in	the	 Oleksandr	Shepotylo	 June	2007	 P.	Flewitt
	 Russian	Federation:	2001–05	 	 	 32724
WPS4266	The	Economic	Community	of	West	 Simplice	G.	Zouhon-Bi	 June	2007	 S.	Zouhon-Bi




WPS4267	Financial	Intermediation	in	the	 Heiko	Hesse	 June	2007	 G.	Johnson
	 Pre-Consolicated	Banking	Sector	in	 	 	 34436
	 Nigeria
WPS4268	Power	to	the	People:	Evidence	from	 Martina	Björkman	 June	2007	 I.	Hafiz
	 a	Randomized	Field	Experiment	of	a	 Jakob	Svensson	 	 37851
	 Community-Based	Monitoring	Project
	 in	Uganda
WPS4269	Shadow	Sovereign	Ratings	for	 Dilip	Ratha	 June	2007	 N.	Aliyeva
	 Unrated	Developing	Countries	 Prabal	De	 	 80524
	 	 Sanket	Mohapatra
WPS4270	Jump-Starting	Self-Employment?	 Rita	Almeida	 June	2007	 A.	Bonfield
	 Evidence	among	Welfare	Participants	 Emanuela	Galasso	 	 31248
	 in	Argentina
WPS4271	Construction,	Corruption,	and	 Charles	Kenny	 June	2007	 C.	Kenny
	 Developing	Countries	 	 	 33540
WPS4272	Migration,	Remittances,	Poverty,	 David	McKenzie	 July	2007	 M.	Sasin
	 and	Human	Capital:	Conceptual	and	 Marcin	J.	Sasin	 	 36877
	 Empirical	Challenges
WPS4273	Rules	of	Origin	and	the	Web	of	East	 Miriam	Manchin	 July	2007	 L.	Yeargin
	 Asian	Free	Trade	Agreements	 Annette	O.	Pelkmans-Balaoing	 81553
WPS4274	Are	Labor	Regulations	Driving	 Mohammad	Amin	 July	2007	 S.	Narsiah
	 Computer	Usage	in	India’s	Retail	 	 	 88768
	 Stores?
WPS4275	Can	Foreign	Lobbying	Enhance	 Kishore	Gawande	 July	2007	 V.	Cornago
	 Development?	The	Case	of	Tourism	 William	Maloney	 	 84039
	 in	the	Caribbean	 Gabriel	V.	Montes	Rojas
WPS4276	Human	Capital,	Trade	Liberalization,	 Tom	Krebs	 July	2007	 V.	Cornago
	 and	Income	Risk	 Pravin	Krishna	 	 84039
	 	 William	Maloney
WPS4277	Climate	Change	Adaptation	in	Africa:	 Sungno	Niggol	Seo	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 A	Microeconomic	Analysis	of	 Robert	Mendelsohn	 	 33716
	 Livestock	Choice
WPS4278	Endogenous	Irrigation:	The	Impact	of	 Pradeep	Kurukulasuriya	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 Climate	Change	on	Farmers	in	 Robert	Mendelsohn	 	 33716
	 Africa
WPS4279	The	Impact	of	Climate	Change	on	 Sungno	Niggol	Seo	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 Livestock	Management	in	Africa:	 Robert	Mendelsohn	 	 33716
	 A	Structural	Ricardian	AnalysisPolicy Research Working Paper Series
	 Title  Author  Date  Contact for paper 
WPS4280	 Governance	Matters	VI:	Aggregate	 Daniel	Kaufmann	 July	2007	 R.	Bonfield
	 and	Individual	Governance:	 Aart	Kraay	 	 31248
	 Indicators,	1996-2006	 Massimo	Mastruzzi
WPS4281	 Credit	Growth	In	Emerging	Europe:	 Sophie	Sirtaine	 July	2007	 S.	Sirtaine
	 A	Cause	For	Stability	Concerns?	 Ilias	Skamnelos	 	 87006
WPS4282	 Are	Cash	Transfers	Made	to	Women	 Norbert	Schady	 July	2007	 I.	Hafiz
	 Spent	Like	Other	Sources	of	Income	 José	Rosero	 	 37851
WPS4283	 Innovation	Shortfalls	 William	Maloney	 July	2007	 V.	Cornago
	 	 Andrés	Rodríguez-Clare	 	 84039
WPS4284	 Customer	Market	Power	and	the	 Neeltje	Van	Horen	 July	2007	 M.	Gamboa
	 Provision	of	Trade	Credit:		 	 	 34847
	 Evidence	from	Eastern	Europe	and	
	 Central	Asia
WPS4285	 Poverty	Analysis	Using	An	 J.	A.	L.	Cranfield	 July	2007	 P.	Flewitt
	 International	Cross-Country	Demand	 Paul	V.	Preckel	 	 32724
	 System	 Thomas	W.	Hertel
WPS4286	 Institutional	Effects	as	Determinants	 Jesús	Álvarez	 July	2007	 S.	Baksh
	 of	Learning	Outcomes:	Exploring	 Vicente	García	Moreno	 	 31085
	 State	Variations	in	Mexico	 Harry	Anthony	Patrinos
WPS4287	 A	Cross-Country	Analysis	of	Public	 Martin	Meleckyy	 July	2007	 M.	Rosenquist
	 Debt	Management	Strategies	 	 	 82602
WPS4288	 Actual	Crop	Water	Use	in	Project	 Robina	Wahaj	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 Countries	A	Synthesis	at	the	 Florent	Maraux	 	 33716
	 Regional	Level	 Giovanni	Munoz
WPS4289	 Sensitivity	of	Cropping	Patterns	in	 Alexander	Lotsch	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 Africa	to	Transient	Climate	Change	 	 	 33716
WPS4290	 The	Impacts	of	Climate	Change	 Kenneth	Strzepek	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 on	Regional	Water	Resources	 Alyssa	McCluskey	 	 33716
	 and	Agriculture	in	Africa
WPS4291	 An	Empirical	Economic	 Suman	Jain	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 AssessmentOf	Impacts	Of	Climate	 	 	 33716
	 Change	On	Agriculture	In	Zambia
WPS4292	 Assessment	of	the	Economic	 Reneth	Mano	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 Impacts	of	Climate	Change	on	 Charles	Nhemachena	 	 33716
	 Agriculture	in	Zimbabwe:	
	 A	Ricardian	Approach
WPS4293	 Assessing	the	Economic	Impacts	 Helmy	M.	Eid	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 of	Climate	Change	on	Agriculture	in		 Samia	M.	El-Marsafawy	 	 33716
	 Egypt:	A	Ricardian	Approach	 Samiha	A.	Ouda
WPS4294	 Scarperation:	An	Empirical	Inquiry		 Shlomi	Dinar	 July	2007	 P.	Kokila
	 into	The	Role	of	Scarcity	in	Fostering		 Ariel	Dinar	 	 33716
	 Cooperation	Between	International		 Pradeep	Kurukulasuriya
	 River	Riparian
WPS4295	 Economic	Benefit	of	Tuberculosis		 Ramanan	Laxminarayan	 August	2007	 M.	Elias
	 Control	 Eili	Klein		 	 82175
	 	 Christopher	Dye	
	 	 Katherine	Floyd	
	 	 Sarah	Darley	
	 	 Olusoji	Adeyi